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CRIMINAL LAW
EXPANDED APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, when applied in criminal
proceedings, bars relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact previously
determined by a verdict of acquittal.' In Ashe v. Swenson 2 the Su-
preme Court established the collateral estoppel defense as a con-
stitutionally mandated ingredient of the double jeopardy guaran-
tee 3 and set forth a working standard for the application of that
' [Collateral estoppel] means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). For a discussion of collateral estoppel in criminal
prosecutions, see A. VESTAL, REs JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-343 to -393 (1969); Note, Criminal
Procedure - Application of the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to State Criminal Prosecutions, 49
N.C.L. REV. 351 (1971).
2 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
3 Id. at 445. The fifth amendment provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. While
the double jeopardy prohibition has always guaranteed that no one be tried twice for the
same offense, as a result of the Ashe decision it also operates to preclude relitigation of all
issues necessarily decided by a prior acquittal.
Traditional double jeopardy protection is comprised of several defenses. Once a defen-
dant has been acquitted of an offense, the same offense cannot be the basis of a new trial.
E.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896). Double jeopardy also prohibits the government from appealing judgments
of acquittal if a reversal would require a new trial. E.g., United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S.
358 (1975). In addition, retrial is barred if the initial trial was aborted after the jury was
impaneled and sworn but before a final judgment was reached. Since jeopardy is said to
"attach" with the swearing of the jury, another trial for the same offense would constitute
double jeopardy. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). An exception to this
rule arises when the initial trial is terminated by a mistrial declared for reasons of "manifest
necessity." See note 26 iinfra.
The definition of "same offense" has traditionally created problems in the application of
the double jeopardy prohibition. Most courts employ the "same evidence" test to determine
whether a defendant has been placed in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. See 49
TEXAS L. REV. 148, 151 (1970). Under this test, which originated with Morey v. Common-
wealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871), if one offense "requires proof of a fact which the other does
not," it is not considered the same offense. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932).
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, urging adoption of the "same transaction"
test, have claimed that it is constitutionally mandated by the double jeopardy clause. See
Moton v. Swenson, 417 U.S. 957 (1974) (dissenting opinion); Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U.S.
1017 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970)-(concurring
opinion). This test requires that different statutory offenses arising out of the same act or
transaction either be prosecuted simultaneously or precluded from litigation. J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 67 (1969).
A number of commentators have described the same evidence test as imposing a
restrictive definition of "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. See Mayers & Yar-
brough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Mayers & Yarbrough]; Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double
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defense in criminal proceedings. This standard requires a tribunal,
in considering a plea of collateral estoppel, to examine the previous
trial proceedings in their entirety and determine whether a rational
jury could have based its verdict upon an issue different from that
which the defendant endeavors to preclude from relitigation. 4
Under this approach, collateral estoppel can only operate to pre-
clude reprosecution of those issues necessarily determined by a prior
verdict of acquittal.5
The Second Circuit has noted that the collateral estoppel de-
fense is rarely available to a criminal defendant since it is particu-
larly difficult to ascertain precisely which issues have been finally
determined by a judgment of acquittal.6 In fact, the task of show-
ing that the verdict in a prior trial necessarily decided the issues
raised in the second prosecution has been labeled a "most difficult
burden."'7 Nevertheless, in United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee,8
the Second Circuit expanded the application of the collateral es-
toppel defense by holding that it bars reprosecution of a defendant
on a criminal count on which a previous jury was deadlocked when,
contemporaneous with this deadlock, there had also been a simul-
taneous acquittal and deadlock of a lesser included offense of the
count charged.9
Appellant Rogers was indicted in state court on two counts of
first degree kidnapping."0 One count charged the offense of ab-
.Jeopardy Clauses: New Lilt, fi'r a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 345
(1956); 69 MICH. L. REV. 762, 768 (1971). Application of the collateral estoppel doctrine to
the double jeopardy guarantee, however, expands double jeopardy protection beyond the
restrictive limits of the same evidence test. Whereas the latter only prohibits relitigation of
the same offense, collateral estoppel operates to preclude the relitigation of those issues
which have been previously settled even though the offenses involved may be different. See
IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[21, at 2751 (2d ed. 1974); Lugar, Criminal Law,
Double Jeopardy and Resludicata, 39 IOWA L. REV. 317 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Lugar];
Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evidentiar"' Ust of Prior Crimes of
l'ich the Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA. ST. L. REV. 511 (1974).
4 397 U.S. at 444; accord, United States v. Davis, 460 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971).
-,See United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tramunti,
500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d
1382 (4th Cir. 1971).
6 United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079
(1974). The prevalence of general verdicts in criminal prosecutions militates against facile
determination of those issues which the jury by its verdict has laid to rest. Lugar, supra note 3,
at 332-33. See also Schaefer, U'rest~ohed Issues in the Laze of Double Jeopardy. Waller and Ashe,
58 CALIF. L. REV\. 391, 395 (1970); Comment, DoubleJeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes
Arising from the Same Transaction, 24 Mo. L. REV. 513, 519 & n.35 (1959).
7 United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1974).
6517 F.2d 1330 (2d Cir. 1975), tert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1976). rev'g
No. 73-CV-459 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 1974).
"517 F.2d at 1334.
IS Rogers was also indicted for felony murder and intentional murder, but was acquitted
on both of these counts. The trial was conducted in the supreme court of the State of New
York. Id. at 1331.
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duction plus sexual abuse; the other charged abduction resulting in
death."1 The trial court instructed the jury that if it found the
defendant not guilty of first degree kidnapping under the abduc-
tion plus abuse count, it should consider the lesser included offense
of second degree kidnapping, viz, simple abduction.12 The court
next charged that if the defendant was acquitted of first and sec-
ond degree kidnapping under that count, the jury could then
consider first degree kidnapping under the count of abduction plus
death.1 3 Finally, the jury was instructed that if it found the defen-
dant not guilty under the abduction plus death count, it could then
again consider the lesser included offense of simple abduction. 14
Under these confusing and erroneous instructions, the jury re-
turned a verdict of not guilty of first and second degree kidnap-
ping under the count of abduction plus sexual abuse. The jury
deadlocked, however, on both offenses under the count of abduc-
tion resulting in death.' 5 A mistrial was therefore declared as to the
latter count, with the anomalous result of a simultaneous deadlock
and acquittal of the lesser included offense of simple abduction.
Rogers was subsequently retried and convicted of the first degree
kidnapping charge of abduction resulting in death. 6
While confined in State prison, Rogers sought habeas corpus
relief.17 He claimed that the jury's acquittal verdict at the first trial
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25(2)(a), (3) (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person
and when:
2. He restrains the person abducted for a period of more than twelve
hours with intent to:
(a) Inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually;
3. The person abducted dies during the abduction ....
t2 See United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 73-CV-459 at 5 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29,
1974). The elements of simple abduction are set forth in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.00(2)
(McKinney 1975). For the relevant provisions see text accompanying note 39 infra.
'" See United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 73-CV-459 at 6 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29,
1974).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Rogers' conviction in the second trial was unanimously affirmed without opinion.
People v. Rogers, 36 App. Div. 2d 1024, 321 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (2d Dep't 1971), cerl. denied, 405
U.S. 956 (1972).
17 Rogers' initial petition for habeas corpus relief in the federal district court was
dismissed for factual insufficiency. United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 71-CV-403
(N.D.N.Y., Aug. 31, 1971). On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded to the district court,
directing it to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. United States ex rel.
Rogers v. LaVallee, 463 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1972). Thereafter, Rogers brought a postconvic-
tion proceeding in the state court where relief was again denied. People v. Rogers, No.
217/1969 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, Feb. 8, 1973). Having thus exhausted his state remedies,
Rogers reapplied for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court where his petition
was dismissed on the merits. United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 73-CV-459
(N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 1974). In the instant case, the Second Circuit considered Rogers' appeal
from that dismissal.
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conclusively established his innocence of simple abduction and that
the State was therefore collaterally estopped from relitigating that
issue in the subsequent reprosecution of abduction resulting in
death.18 The federal district court rejected this argument, finding
the confused and inconsistent verdict not conclusive of Rogers'
guilt or innocence of the act of abduction. 19 The Second Circuit,
however, reversed on the ground that the jury had in fact ren-
dered a dispositive acquittal of that offense.20 Judge Oakes, writing
for a divided panel,2' stated that the source of the jury's inconsis-
tent verdict was the erroneous trial court charge: the jury should
have been instructed to consider second degree kidnapping only
after it found the defendant not guilty of both counts of first
degree kidnapping.2 2 Nevertheless, according to the court, under
the rule of Ashe, the verdict of acquittal necessarily decided the
issues raised in the second prosecution. 23
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Lumbard criticized the ma-
jority's application of the collateral estoppel rule.2 4 Viewing the
confused verdict in its entirety, the judge regarded the majority's
unqualified recognition of the acquittal of simple abduction ne-
glectful of the equally important deadlock on the same offense.25
Thus, he refused to accept the majority's conclusion that the jury
had, in fact, dispositively resolved the essential abduction issue.26
"8 Brief for Relator-Appellant at 7, United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d
1330 (2d Cir. 1975).
1, United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 73-CV-459 at 8 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29,
1974).
20 517 F.2d at 1334. The court stated: "In fact .... the jury did [acquit Rogers], however
erroneously and no matter how confused." Id.
21 Circuit Judge Oakes and District Judge Bartels, sitting by designation, constituted the
majority. Circuit Judge Lumbard dissented.
22 517 F.2d at 1331-32.
23 Id. at 1334.
24 Id. at 1337 n.4 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
25 1d. at 1335.
26 The determinative factor in the dissent's view was that the first trial resulted in the
court's declaration of a mistrial with respect to the offenses of abduction resulting in death
and simple abduction. Id. The dissent took the position that the instant case fit within the
established rule, most recently expressed by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973), that the double jeopardy prohibition is no bar to reprosecution when a
mistrial has been declared for reasons of"manifest necessity." 517 F.2d at 1336 (Lumbard,
J., dissenting). A mistrial is most frequently deemed manifestly necessary when the jury
cannot agree. See Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909). For other examples of this rule, see
Parker v. United States, 507 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975)
(reprosecution permissible after declaration of manifestly necessary mistrial upon juror's
hearing of prejudicial radio broadcast), and United States v. Walden, 448 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973) (reprosecution impermissible since no manifest
necessity for declaration of mistrial after two jurors saw defendant handcuffed).
The Rogers majority, on the other hand, focused primarily on the trial court's verdict of
acquittal and therefore concluded that the Somerville rule was not controlling. 517 F.2d at
1334-35.
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The Second Circuit in Rogers has adopted a position which
gives expansive estoppel powers to a verdict of acquittal. In so
doing, it appears that the court has exceeded the estoppel standard
espoused by the Supreme Court in Ashe. The Ashe majority cau-
tioned that the collateral estoppel rule in criminal cases should not
be applied hypertechnically, but must be used realistically and
rationally.27 More specifically, the Court declared that its approach
requires an examination of the entire proceedings2 8 in order to
properly conclude whether or not "a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. 2 9
Prior to Rogers, in United States v. Tramunti30 and United States v.
Gugliaro,31 the Second Circuit vigorously pursued the Ashe direc-
tive. Defendants Tramunti and Gugliaro had been indicted along
with 14 others on conspiracy charges arising from the manipula-
tion of securities of the Imperial Investment Corp. 32 Although the
defendants were acquitted of these charges, they were subsequently
convicted of perjury based on false testimony given at the Imperial
trials.33 Each defendant raised the collateral estoppel defense
claiming that his prior acquittal established that the jury in the
Imperial trials had determined in his favor the issue of the truth-
fulness of his testimony.34 Rejecting the defendants' contentions,
the Gugliaro and Tramunti courts stressed the necessity of viewing
the events of the conspiracy proceedings in their entirety and
appeared to place particular emphasis on the nature of the evi-
dence and the charge given by the trial court.35 Upon examination
of the proceedings, it was determined that the juries could have
based their respective verdicts on an issue other than the truthful-
27 397 U.S. at 444.
21 The Ashe Court emphasized the need to examine the prior proceedings in their
entirety, including the "'pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter.' " Id.,
quoting Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 3, at 38.
29 397 U.S. at 444, quoting Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 3, at 38-39. In Ashe, six
poker players were robbed by a group of men. Petitioner Ashe was prosecuted for the
robbery of Knight, one of the players. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty for want of
sufficient evidence. Ashe was subsequently retried for the robbery of Roberts, another poker
player. This time, however, the State's evidence was stronger and Ashe was convicted. The
Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as an ingredient of the double jeopardy
guarantee, barred the reprosecution of Ashe since it had been determined previously by the
jury in the first trial that the petitioner was not among the robbers. 397 U.S. at 445-47.
30 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974), noted in 49 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 313 (1975).
", 501 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974).
32 500 F.2d at 1337; 501 F.2d at 69.
33 500 F.2d at 1337; 501 F.2d at 69.
34 500 F.2d at 1346; 501 F.2d at 70.
35 500 F.2d at 1346-47; 501 F.2d at 71.
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ness of the defendants' testimony.3 6 Accordingly, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was held to be inoperative.3 7
By focusing primarily upon the verdict of acquittal, the Rogers
majority appears to have circumvented the directive of Ashe which
requires an examination of the proceedings in their entirety. It is
submitted that the court, in effect, removed the acquittal verdict
from the context of the proceedings by holding that it operated to
preclude relitigation of the abduction issue despite the existence of
a simultaneous deadlock. An examination of the entire proceed-
ings, including the trial court's instructions and the jury's subse-
quent deadlock, lends strength to the dissent's position that the
acquittal verdict was not dispositive of the essential abduction is-
sue. 38
To "abduct," under the governing statute, is
to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either
(a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be
found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly physical force.3 9
A .jury which correctly understood the elements of simple abduc-
tion could have acquitted Rogers of that offense under the count of
abduction plus sexual abuse for any or all of three reasons: (1) the
defendant did not commit the act of restraint of a person under
any circumstances; (2) the defendant lacked the requisite intent to
prevent the person's liberation; and/or (3) the defendant did not
employ either of the two proscribed methods of restraint.
36 On the basis of its examination of the nature of the evidence which had been
presented at trial, the Gugliaro court surmised that the jury might have doubted the defen-
dant's credibility, yet acquitted him on finding that he lacked the requisite intent or sufficient
knowledge to be a conspirator. 501 F.2d at 71. In Tramunli, the court closely examined the
trial court charge and the weakness of the Government's evidence and concluded that the
jury could have disbelieved the defendant's alibi and still have acquitted him for lack of
specific intent. 500 F.2d at 1347.
500 F.2d at 1349; 501 F.2d at 72. Other circuits have similarly adhered to the Ashe
requirement of examining the events of the entire proceedings in order to determine
whether the relevant issues have already been settled. In United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d
127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974), for example, where the Fourth Circuit
held that a verdict of acquittal on a charge of child abuse did not establish the defendant's
innocence with respect to all acts of misconduct against the child, the court expressly
recognized Ashe as "authority for examining the complete record of the initial trial to
determine what has been litigated and decided." 484 F.2d at 137. Accord, Johnson v. Estelle,
506 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1024 (1975); Phillips v. United States, 502 F.2d
227 (4th Cir. 1974), re,d per ruriam, 518 F.2d 108 (1975) (en banc).
31 I am not persuaded that the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . prohibited New York
from again trying James Rogers .... In contrast to the majority, which focuses on
the not-guilty verdicts . . . . for me the determinative consideration is that Rogers'
first trial ended in a hung jury, deadlocked over whether Rogers was guilty of
abduction resulting in death or even simple abduction . ...
517 F.2d at 1335 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
31 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.00(2) (McKinney 1975).
[Vol. 50:339
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An acquittal of simple abduction under the count of abduction
plus sexual abuse for any of these reasons necessarily dictates an
acquittal of simple abduction and first degree kidnapping under
the count of abduction plus death. Thus, a rational jury which
clearly understood the components of simple abduction would not,
after having voted to acquit the defendant of that crime under one
count, entertain any doubts with respect to the defendant's guilt of
the very same crime under another count. The very existence of
the deadlock, therefore, may be viewed as evidence of the possibil-
ity that the jury was confused and acquitted Rogers for a reason
other than one of the three set forth above. The presence of the
erroneous trial court instructions increases the likelihood that this
was in fact the case. As both the dissent" and the district court41
noted, the jury may have concluded that the offense of simple
abduction, as charged, was to be treated as two separate offenses,
each containing different elements derived from the greater of-
fense to which it was tied. For example, the jury may have thought
that simple abduction under the count of abduction plus sexual
abuse included the 12-hour time requirement of that major of-
fense,42 whereas simple abduction under the count of abduction
plus death contained no such requirement.43 Arguably, therefore,
the Rogers majority has given estoppel effect to an acquittal which
did not resolve the essential issue of the subsequent reprosecution.
The Ashie decision and prior decisions of the Second Circuit
44
indicate that the estoppel powers of an acquittal should extend only
to issues which have necessarily been decided in a prior prosecution.
The expansive interpretation given the scope of the collateral es-
toppel defense by the court in Rogers sharply contrasts with the
approach of these earlier holdings. As the Second Circuit noted in
Tramunti, a heavy burden rests upon the defendant to show that
the previous verdict necessarily decided the issues which he seeks
to preclude from relitigation. 45 Mindful that "it is usually impossi-
40 517 F.2d at 1335 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
41 United States ex reL Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 73-CV-459 at 8 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29,
1974).42 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.25(2) (McKinney 1975).
43 Id. § 135.00(2), quoted in text accompanying note 39 supra. The majority was wary of
judicial inquiry into the minds of the jurors: "[T]o read in a 12 hour definition to the second
degree kidnapping charge is conjecture and ignores the fact that at no time was such a
charge given." 517 F.2d at 1334 n.10. The majority, on the other hand, appears to have
ignored the fact that the erroneous trial court instructions clearly confused the jury and
created an extraordinary opportunity for the jury to indulge in such conjecture.
44 See United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tramunti,
500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974).
45 500 F.2d at 1346.
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ble to determine with any precision upon what basis the jury
reached a verdict," the Tramunti court declared that "it is a rare
situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to
a defendant. 46
In United States v. Kramer,4' a rare case in which the Second
Circuit sustained the defendant's reliance on the collateral estoppel
defense, it did so only because of the absence of any ground for
acquittal other than that upon which the defendant relied. In
Kramer, the appellant had been acquitted of a number of substan-
tive offenses arising from the burglary of two United States post
offices. He was later convicted of four related offenses arising from
the same burglaries.48 On appeal from that conviction, Kramer
alleged that the Government was seeking to relitigate facts deter-
mined in his favor in the first prosecution. The Second Circuit
examined the initial proceedings and discovered that the jury at
the first trial had been presented with one exceedingly simple issue,
namely, the defendant's participation or lack of participation in the
post office thefts. 49 Accordingly, the court concluded that the ver-
dict of acquittal at the first trial could only mean that Kramer was
not responsible for the burglaries: "Unlike many other criminal
cases, this one was devoid of alternative [bases upon which the
acquittal could rest]." 50
Taken together, the Kramer, Gugliaro, and Tramunti decisions
reflect what has been the limited availability of the collateral estop-
pel defense in the Second Circuit. Rogers, on the other hand,
represents a marked departure from this approach. The aftermath
of this decision may be even greater uncertainty as to the judicial
disposition of pleas of double jeopardy based on the rule of collat-
eral estoppel. Hopefully, Rogers will be treated as an exception to
the general rule because of its unique and irksome fact pattern. 51 It
appears that the Second Circuit strained to uphold the integrity of
46 1d.
47 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).48 Id. at 912.
49 1d. at 914.
50 Id. The Fifth Circuit sustained the collateral estoppel defense in Johnson v. Estelle,
506 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1024 (1975). There, the court considered
whether an acquittal of burglary with intent to commit rape barred a later conviction of
assault with intent to commit rape. Engaging in extensive analysis of the possible bases for
the acquittal, the court concluded that a rational jury would not have acquitted on the basis
of issues different from those raised in the second trial. 506 F.2d at 350. The court
apparently reasoned that the basis of the jury's acquittal was so clear as to rule out all other
alternatives.
51 The Rogers district court remarked that "this court's research indicates the petition
herein presents a case of first impression and is sni generis factually." United States ex rel.
Rogers v. LaVallee, No. 73-CV-459 at 2 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 1974).
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the double jeopardy guarantee, perhaps losing sight of the impor-
tant balance that must be struck between the interests of a defen-
dant and the interests of society as a whole. 2
Nina Shreve
TECHNICAL DEFECTS IN FEDERAL SEARCH WARRANTS
United States v. Burke
In addition to guaranteeing freedom from "unreasonable
searches and seizures," the fourth amendment declares that no
"[search] Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which implements this con-
stitutional mandate, specifies a number of technical requirements
with which a federal warrant must comply before evidence pro-
cured pursuant thereto can be introduced as such in a prosecution
for a federal crime. These technical requirements must be com-
plied with both when a warrant is issued pursuant to rule 41 by
either a state or federal magistrate and when a validly issued state
warrant is treated as a federal warrant in a federal criminal pro-
ceeding because "federal officials participated in its procuration or
execution."'
There are, however, circumstances in which noncompliance
with rule 41 may be overlooked. Notwithstanding the specificity of
the rule, there appears to be a growing awareness of the need to
disregard those requirements which are not constitutionally man-
dated, thus limiting the extent to which evidence seized pursuant to
a defective federal warrant must be suppressed. 2 Adopting this
12 In his dissent in United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S.
358 (1975), Judge Lumbard spoke of the public interest which must be considered when a
defendant raises the double jeopardy defense. In his view, the individual's interest in
escaping the anxiety of a second trial must be weighed against the equally important societal
interest in public justice. 490 F.2d at 884 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
1 United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 43 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974).
2 A number of recent cases indicate the judiciary's growing tolerance for technically
defective search warrants. See United States v. Sturgeon, 501 F.2d 1270 (8th "Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974); United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 908 (1974); United States v. Soriano, 482 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on rehearing en banc, 497 F.2d 147 (1974). In line with this approach, the
American Law Institute (ALI) recommends exclusion of seized evidence only where the
alleged "defect is of constitutional dimension." ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 290.2, comment at 563 (Proposed Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975). In other
words, the ALI advocates denial of a motion to suppress when the defects cited as giving rise
1975]
